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This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior
of pharmaceutical incumbents just before they lose patent protection. The approach involves looking
at a cross-section of markets and examining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in the size of the market.
Under certain conditions, investment levels will be monotone in market size if firms are not influenced
by a desire to deter entry.  Strategic investments, however, may be nonmonotone because entry deterrence
is unnecessary in very small markets and impossible in very large ones, resulting in overall nonmonotonic
investment.  The pharmaceutical data contain advertising, product proliferation, and pricing information
for a sample of drugs which lost patent protection between 1986 and 1992. Among the findings consistent
with an entry deterrence motivation are that incumbents in markets of intermediate size have lower
levels of advertising and are more likely to reduce advertising immediately prior to patent expiration.
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The insight that ﬁrms may make “strategic investments” to alter future competitive con-
ditions is one of the most fundamental ideas in industrial organization. The chapter on
“Entry, Accomodation, and Exit” is easily the longest in Tirole’s (1988) text. In it, Tirole
reviews arguments about how excess capacity, capital structure, advertising, contractual
practices, learning-by-doing, and long-run decisions can be used to deter entry.1 Strategic
investment models are diﬃcult to test directly, however, and the vast majority of this lit-
erature is theoretical. In this paper, we propose a new empirical approach for examining
strategic entry deterrence.
Our applied focus is on the pharmaceutical industry. Using a panel of drugs that
lost their U.S. patent protection between 1986 and 1992, we explore how pharmaceutical
incumbents have dealt with the threat of generic entry. We examine incumbents’ advertis-
ing, product proliferation, and pricing decisions as patent expiration approached, and ask
whether the behaviors appear to be inﬂuenced by an entry-deterrence motive.
We begin in Section 2 with a discussion of strategic entry deterrence and some moti-
vation for our approach. We modify the textbook model to bring it closer to empirical
applications: we assume that entry costs are random and unknown to the incumbent so
that it is impossible to perfectly forecast whether entry will occur. We review what is meant
by “strategic entry deterrence” in this setting. We note that the incentive to deter entry
will be stronger in intermediate-sized markets than in very small or very large markets.
In the former, no investments are needed to deter entry. In the latter, deterring entry is
often impossible. A simple numerical example illustrates how the nonmonotonicity of the
entry-deterrence incentive can lead to a nonmonotonic relationship between equilibrium
investment levels and market size.
Our approach to testing whether ﬁrms are actively trying to deter entry is a classic
reduced-form approach: we identify a prediction of the strategic investment model that dif-
fers depending on whether ﬁrms take entry-deterrence beneﬁts into account when choosing
1Some of the classic papers in this literature are Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1983a, 1983b, 1984), Dixit (1980), Schmalensee (1978, 1981), Gelman and Salop (1983), Judd
(1985), Aghion and Bolton (1987), and Cooper (1986).
1their actions; and then test this prediction. The formal results underlying the approach are
presented in Section 3. Our main IO theory result is a demonstration that, under speciﬁed
conditions, actions will be monotonically related to a market size parameter if ﬁrms are not
inﬂuenced by an entry deterrence motive. Several examples are used to provide intuition
for the required conditions. The important implication of the theoretical result is that one
can reject the null hypothesis that ﬁrms are not actively trying to deter entry by testing
and rejecting the hypothesis that there is a monotonic relationship between ﬁrms’ actions
and market size in a cross-section of markets.
Several recent papers have discussed ways of performing statistical hypothesis tests that
a relationship is monotonically increasing.2 Section 4 contains a brief discussion of this lit-
erature, a description of the tests we will use, and some additional monotonicity theorems
relating to models with measurement error and endogenous right-hand side variables. Ro-
bustness to such factors is a potential advantage of an approach focusing on monotonicity.
In Section 5 we turn our attention to the pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical
industry is an important industry that has attracted a great deal of attention in policy
circles. It also has several features that make it a nice environment in which to study
strategic entry deterrence. One of these is that one can obtain a sizable sample of similarly
situated incumbents facing a threat of entry by looking at manufacturers of branded drugs
whose patent protection is about to expire. Another is that there are several potential tools
that incumbents might use to deter entry, and we were able to obtain data on several of the
most important: advertising, product proliferation, and pricing. A third is that there is a
change in entry conditions within each market—entry is prohibited until a known date. Our
approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence only requires a single cross-section, but
having data both on actions immediately prior to patent expiration and actions in earlier
years when patent expiration was less salient allows us to also implement a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences version of our test.
The ﬁrst thing we do in our analysis is to identify a proxy for “market size” and note
that our dataset contains suﬃcient heterogeneity in market size to make it plausible that
2These include Hall and Heckman (2000), Ghosal, Sen and van der Vaart (2000), and Gijbels, Hall, Jones
and Koch (2000).
2we could ﬁnd nonmonotonicities. Speciﬁcally, revenue received in the U.S. in the years
immediately prior to patent expiration can serve as a proxy for market size because it is
a strong predictor of whether generic entry will occur.3 The lowest-revenue drugs in our
dataset are unlikely to ever face generic competition. For high-revenue drugs generic entry
is a near certainty.
We then examine four incumbent behaviors that might plausibly be involved in an
entry deterrence strategy. “Detail advertising” is the practice of sending representatives to
doctors’ oﬃces to promote a drug via one-on-one conversations. “Journal advertising” is the
placement of advertisements for a drug in medical journals. We use the term “presentation
proliferation” to refer to ﬁrms’ decisions about whether to sell a drug in small or large
number of presentations, e.g. should it be oﬀered just in a 100mg tablets or should the
ﬁrm also produce a 50mg tablet, a 200mg tablet, a gelcap, an oral liquid, etc. Finally, we
examine pricing. The literature on “limit pricing” is one of earliest and best known parts
of the entry deterrence literature.4
We look for evidence that each of these behaviors is inﬂuenced by the entry-deterrence
motive in two ways. First, we take a pure cross-sectional approach: we look at the relation-
ship between each behavior and pre-expiration revenues in the cross-section of drugs and
test whether the relationship is nonmonotonic. We ﬁnd some evidence of nonmonotonicity
in the journal advertising data. The form of the nonmonotonicity is that journal adver-
tising is unusually low for drugs in intermediate-sized markets. This is what one would
expect under a strategic-entry deterrence theory: ﬁrms in intermediate-sized markets have
an incentive to let their market languish to make it less attractive to generic entrants.
Second, we examine how incumbents change their behavior as patent expiration nears.
We ﬁnd some evidence of a nonmonotonic relationship between behavior changes and mar-
ket size in detail advertising and (less strongly) in product proliferation. The changes in
detail advertising have a similar pattern to that noted above: it is most likely to be reduced
in the intermediate-sized markets.
We conclude that there appears to be some evidence of strategic entry-deterrence by
3Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Bae (1997), and Scott Morton (2000) previously reported similar results.
4See, for example, Gaskins (1971), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), and
Klemperer (1987).
3pharmaceutical incumbents. More broadly, we hope that our results also suggest that
monotonicity tests may be a useful way to provide evidence on “strategic investment”
theories in industrial organization and other ﬁelds.
Our paper can be seen as related to two empirical literatures in industrial organization.
First, a number of papers have previously explored pricing, advertising, and entry in the
pharmaceutical industry.5 Most closely related to our work is Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz
(1991), a descriptive study based on thirty drugs with patents expiring between 1976 and
1987. They look mostly at the average behavior of incumbents before and after expiration
and also separate drugs into low and high revenue categories and see if incumbent adver-
tising behavior diﬀers. Scott Morton (2000) focuses on the determinants of generic entry
in a data set that overlaps substantially with ours. In addition to looking at exogenous
market characteristics, she also looks for eﬀects of incumbents’ advertising expenditures on
the probability of generic entry. Grabowski and Vernon (1992) also study a panel of drugs
with expiring patents and focus on post-entry behavior of both incumbents and generic
entrants. Ellison and Wolfram (2006) examine pricing as a potentially strategic investment
to forestall future regulation. They ﬁnd that price increases by pharmaceutical ﬁrms during
the Clinton health care reform debate were related to measures of ﬁrms’ potential losses
from drug price regulation.
A second literature to which we contribute is the empirical literature on strategic entry
deterrence (and entry accommodation). Developing structural tests of whether particular
investments are strategic has been seen as diﬃcult. The one paper we are aware of that
has attempted this approach is Kadiyali’s (1996) study of the market for ﬁlm. Kadiyali
estimates price and advertising elasticites and argues that observed levels of price and
advertising by Eastman Kodak were inconsistent with static monopoly proﬁt maximization
but consistent with entry deterring behavior. It has been more common to provide indirect
evidence that investments are chosen strategically by showing that investments do aﬀect
5Some notable papers are, for instance, Masson and Steiner (1985), Comanor (1986), Grabowski and
Vernon (1990), Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991), Frank and Salkever (1992), Scherer (1993), Berndt,
Griliches and Rosett (1993), Griliches and Cockburn (1994), Berndt, Cockburn and Griliches (1996), Frank
and Salkever (1997), Ellison, Cockburn, Griliches and Hausman (1997), Lu and Comanor (1998), Ellison
(1998), Scott Morton (1999), and Ellison and Wolfram (2006). There are a number of books of interest
about the economics of pharmaceuticals including Walker (1971), Schwartzman (1976), Temin (1980), and
Schweitzer (1997).
4future competition (which will lead us to conclude that investments must be strategic if we
believe that ﬁrms are rational and aware of the eﬀect on competition). One can think of
Chevalier’s (1995a, 1995b) studies of the eﬀect of capital restructuring on entry and exit
and supermarket pricing, Lieberman’s (1987) discussion of the responses by incumbents in
chemical industries to rivals’ additions of capacity, and Scott Morton’s (2000) discussion of
the eﬀects of advertising on entry as providing evidence of this sort. Lieberman also looks
for evidence of entry deterring behavior in cross-sectional patterns in examining whether
there is more excess capacity in markets which are more concentrated. A third approach
taken by Goolsbee and Syverson (2004) in the airline industry is to examine how incumbent
behavior changes in response to exogenous changes in potential entry that otherwise have
no eﬀect on current competitive conditions.6
2 Strategic entry deterrence
In this section we develop a simple model to review the idea of strategic entry deterrence
and bring out its implications in a framework suited to empirical applications. We use a
numerical example to illustrate how nonmonotonic patterns can arise in cross-section data.
2.1 A model
The prototypical model of strategic entry deterrence is a three-stage game like the ﬁrst one
in Figure 1. In the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent ﬁrm 1 chooses an investment level A at a
cost of c(A). Assume that c0(A) > 0 and c00(A) ≥ 0. Before the second stage, the potential
entrant (ﬁrm 2) observes the incumbent’s choice of A. Firm 2 then chooses whether to
enter the market, which requires paying a sunk cost of E. In the third stage, either the
incumbent is a monopolist or the incumbent and entrant compete as duopolists. If the
incumbent is a monopolist, assume that it chooses some action xm
1 (A) in the third period
and as a result earns proﬁts, πm∗
1 (A) ≡ π1(xm
1 (A),A). If entry occurs, assume that the
unique Nash equilibrium of the third stage game involves the ﬁrms choosing actions x∗
1(A)
and x∗
2(A) and receiving proﬁts πd∗
i (A) ≡ πd
i (x∗
1(A),x∗
2(A),A). Assume that πm∗
1 (A) and
6Other approaches have also been taken in a few papers. Smiley (1988) reports evidence from surveys
of ﬁrms about what strategies they use to deter entry. Cooper, Garvin and Kagel (1997) examines a
limit-pricing model experimentally. Dafny (2005) applies our approach in studying hospital markets.
5πd∗
i (A) are concave, and that the ﬁrms’ best responses are always interior and given by the
unique solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Tirole (1988) describes how a large number of classic papers in industrial organization
(and corporate ﬁnance and international trade) can be ﬁt within this framework. The key
insight is that the “investment” A can be any action that is not easily undone. The could be
a standard investment like building a new plant that will have a lower marginal production
cost. It could also, however, be something like a lobbying expenditure, choosing a product
design that makes the product less (or more) similar to other products, building up goodwill
through an advertising campaign, or taking on debt. Entry deterring investments can be
welfare-reducing, but this need not be the case.
The one departure we have made from the way strategic investment models are presented
in Tirole (1988) (and in most papers) is that we assume that the entry cost E is stochastic
with CDF F(E) and that Firm 2 learns the entry cost before making its entry decision.
The primary consequence is that Firm 1 will not know for sure whether entry will occur
when making its investment decision. We think that this is a more realistic depiction of the
situation ﬁrms face in the real-world and as well as a necessary modiﬁcation for empirical
applications.
2.2 The strategic entry deterrence incentive
In this model, the incumbent ﬁrm 1 is said to practice “strategic entry deterrence” in that it
“distorts” A away from the level that maximizes proﬁts (holding ﬁrm 2’s entry probability
ﬁxed) in hopes of deterring entry by ﬁrm 2. More precisely, let A∗
ED be the sequential
equilibrium choice of A in this model. What IO economists mean when they say that
investment is “distorted” is that A∗
ED diﬀers from the investment level, A∗
ND, that would
be chosen in the second game pictured in Figure 1.7 In the second game, ﬁrm 2 does
not observe ﬁrm 1’s investment level until after the entry decision has been made. Hence,
investment can not have a causal eﬀect on the entry decision. The nonstrategic investment
7To avoid confusing people who know the literature we should note that we have simpliﬁed the standard
presentation to omit any mention of strategic entry accomodation. Our assumption that A is observed at
t = 2
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Figure 1: The model
7level A∗
ND can be thought of either as reﬂecting what would happen if there was no entry
deterrence motive or as reﬂecting what would happen if there was an entry deterrence
motive but the incumbent ignored it. Whether incumbents behave in this manner can be
of interest for several reasons. For example, antitrust authorities may insist that ﬁrms do
not take actions that serve only to eliminate future competition, and economists may want
to know whether ﬁrms are suﬃciently rational and forward looking to invest strategically
(and whether the long-run consequences of an investment are what we think they are).
Aspects of the strategic entry deterrence motive are most apparent in the ﬁrst-order
conditions that describe A∗
ED and A∗
ND. In the strategic entry deterrence model, ﬁrm 1’s
expected proﬁt is a function of its ﬁrst period investment:
E(π1(A)) = F(πd∗
2 (A))πd∗
1 (A) + (1 − F(πd∗
2 (A)))πm∗
1 (A) − c(A).
In the model with no strategic entry deterrence motive, ﬁrm 1’s expected proﬁt depends
both on the actual value of A and on ﬁrm 2’s belief about the value of A that was chosen in
the ﬁrst period. In equilibrium, ﬁrm 2 will assign probablility one to ﬁrm 1 having chosen
A∗





1 (A) + (1 − F(πd∗
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ND)))πm∗
1 (A) − c(A).














































The diﬀerence between the two ﬁrst order conditions is the presence of the ﬁnal term in
the ﬁrst-order condition for A∗
ED. This term is the “strategic entry deterrence” incentive.
Because ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is higher when it is a monopolist, it has an incentive to distort its
investment to reduce ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt (which reduces the likelihood of ﬁrm 2 entering).
The main observation about the strategic entry deterrence incentive we would like to
highlight is that it may be larger in intermediate-sized markets than in very small or very
8large markets. The incentive is a product of three terms. The third of these, f(πd∗
2 (A∗
ED)),
is the likelihood that ﬁrm 2’s ﬁxed entry costs are exactly equal to the equilibrium proﬁts
ﬁrm 2 would earn at the post-entry stage, making ﬁrm 2 indiﬀerent between entering and
not entering. In very small markets this likelihood will be small because the ﬁxed entry
costs will almost surely be much larger than the duopoly proﬁts. In very large markets
it will be small because the ﬁxed entry costs will almost surely be much smaller than the
duopoly proﬁts. In intermediate-sized markets there is a greater chance that the investment
will have a pivotal eﬀect on entry.
2.3 An example of entry-deterrence in a cross-section of markets
In this section, we present a concrete example of a strategic investment model and discuss
cross-sectional implications.
Example 1 Consider a cross-section of markets. Suppose that the ith market has a mass
zi of potential consumers, but that the markets are otherwise identical. Let A reﬂect expen-
ditures on a form of advertising that raises potential consumers’ valuations for all products
in the product class. More speciﬁcally, assume that each market contains consumers with
heterogeneous types, θ, distributed uniformly uniformly on [0,1], and that if the monopolist
spends ziA2/2 on advertising in market i, a consumer of type θ receives utility θA − p1 if
he buys the (branded) good from ﬁrm 1 at price p1, 1
2θA − p2 if he buys the (generic) good
from ﬁrm 2 at price p2, and zero if he buys neither good.
In the ﬁnal period of this model it is easy to check that a monopolist sets p1 = A
2 and
receives proﬁt zA








Figure 2 contains a graph of the equilibrium advertising levels in this model when the
distribution F of entry costs is log normal with mean 0.0025 and variance 0.0015. In the
model without entry deterrence motives, A declines smoothly from 1
4 at z = 0 to 8
49 in the
limit as z → ∞.8 When there is also an entry deterrence motive, advertising levels are
similar when z is small, but substantially lower in markets of small to intermediate size
8Note that in order to show what happens as z goes from zero to inﬁnity we have rescaled the x-axis on
the graph using x = z/(z + 1).
9as ﬁrm 1 distorts its advertising downward to deter entry. In larger markets ﬁrm 1 begins
to give up on entry deterrence, and the advertising levels in the strategic entry deterrence
model approach the equilibrium values of the model without entry deterrence.
A notable feature of this example is that the relationship between advertising and market
size is monotonic in the model without the entry deterrence incentive and nonmonotonic
in the model with the entry deterrence incentive. In the section that follows we discuss the
generality of this observation and the possibility of basing tests of strategic intent on it.
2.4 An aside on structural estimation
Few empirical papers have attempted to provide evidence on strategic entry deterrrence
via structural methods. At ﬁrst, one might think that this is surprising: in theory a
structural test is as simple as testing which of the competing ﬁrst-order conditions for A
best ﬁts the data. In practice, however, such an approach can be very diﬃcult. By the
very nature of these models, entry deterrence can only occur when investments have long
term consequences, which is a case when econometric estimates are more diﬃcult. Also,
to compute the terms in the ﬁrst order conditions, one needs estimates of the incumbent’s
prior on the likelihood of entry, and what the long run beneﬁt of the investment would have
been in the counterfactual state of the world in which entry did or did not occur. Each of
these can also be a challenge to estimate.9
3 Some Results on Monotonicity and Entry Deterrence Mo-
tives
In the classic reduced-form approach to empirical industrial organization, one identiﬁes
where competing models make diﬀerent predictions and then tests those diﬀerences. The
null hypothesis for the test we have in mind is that investments are not inﬂuenced by the
strategic entry deterrence motive. In this section we discuss conditions under which invest-
ments that are not inﬂuenced by the strategic entry deterrence motive will be monotone in
the market size. Under those conditions, if the data are nonmonotone, one can conclude
9See Kadiyali (1996) for one structural estimation. Recent advances in the estimation of dynamic struc-
tural models, e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2006), and Berry, Ostrovsky,
and Pakes (2005), should provide additional opportunities for work along these lines.
10that investments are inﬂuenced by the strategic entry deterrence motive (or that auxilliary
assumptions of our propositions are violated).
3.1 A basic monotonicity result: the direct and competition eﬀects
Consider the model of investment without an entry deterrence motivation. Suppose that
the proﬁt and cost functions also depend on a characteristic z of the market. Our leading
example will be the number of potential consumers in the market. Assume that the variable
z is ordered so that larger values of z correspond to markets that are more proﬁtable for
ﬁrm 2, i.e., ∂
∂zπd∗
2 (A,z) > 0.
In the nonstrategic investment model, investments will covary with z for two reasons.










The direct eﬀect is positive if increasing z raises the marginal beneﬁt from the investment
more than it raises the marginal cost of the investment (holding entry probabilities ﬁxed).
When the direct eﬀect is positive, it gives the incumbent an incentive to invest more when
z is larger. A negative direct eﬀect gives the opposite incentive.







The competition eﬀect is positive if the marginal beneﬁt of the investment is larger when
ﬁrm 1 is engaged in duopoly competition than it is when ﬁrm 1 is a monopolist. A larger
value of z makes it more likely that ﬁrm 2 will enter. When the competition eﬀect is
positive, it provides an incentive for ﬁrm 1 to invest more when z is larger.
The following simple proposition identiﬁes a set of circumstances in which investment
levels will be monotone in z.
Proposition 1 Let A∗
ND(z) be the equilibrium investment level in the model of investment
absent entry deterrence motivations described above. Suppose
dπd∗
2
dz > 0.10 Then A∗
ND(z)















dz , the added assumption can be thought of as a requirement
that the direct eﬀect of z on ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts is greater than the indirect eﬀect that comes from ﬁrm 1 changing
its investment level in response to changing market conditions. While this assumption is often satisﬁed, it
is stronger than is necessary. By expanding
dπd∗
2
dz before solving for
dA
dz it is easy to see that it suﬃces to
11is monotone increasing if the direct and competition eﬀects are positive and A∗
ND(z) is
monotone decreasing if the direct and competition eﬀects are negative.11
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Remark 1: Proposition 1 is not a result that says that investment without an entry
deterrence motive is monotone in z provided some minor technical conclusions hold. We
get monotonicity if the direct and competition eﬀects work in the same direction. In some
applications, the two eﬀects go in the same direction. In others they would not. One must
think about whether an application is of the former or latter type before interpreting a
violation of monotonicity as evidence that investments reﬂect strategic entry deterrence
concerns.
Remark 2: When examining the relationship between investment levels and mar-
ket sizes, one has substantial latitude in deﬁning the left- and right-hand-side variables.
Monotone transformations of either variable (like taking the log of A) will not aﬀect whether
a relationship is monotonic, but other choices one makes in deﬁning variables clearly can.
For example, a graph of total advertising expenditure vs. population could look very diﬀer-
ent from a graph of per capita advertising expenditure vs. population. Appropriate choices
for variable deﬁnitions will reﬂect two concerns: the variables should be chosen so that one
would expect the direct and competition eﬀects to be of the same sign; and one should deﬁne
them so that the direct eﬀects are not so strong so as to make it implausible that strategic
entry deterrence motives will be strong enough to lead to nonmonotonicities. For exam-
ple, in many applications total advertising expenditures will be approximately proportional




































This will always hold if the direction in which ﬁrm 1 changes A as competition becomes more likely reduces
ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts (so that the right hand side is negative). For example, this would be the case for an investment
in a form of norivalrous advertising which raised consumer awareness of or valuation for all products in a
product class. Otherwise, it will be necessary that the term on the right hand side not be too large, which
will hold, for example, if the distribution of entry costs is suﬃciently diﬀuse so that the density term is
suﬃciently small.
11To make the propositions easier to read, we have written them using words like increasing and positive
rather than nondecreasing and nonnegative. The results extend in all of the obvious ways, e.g. investment
is monotone nondecreasing if the direct and competition eﬀects are both nonnegative, and investment is
monotone increasing if the direct and competition eﬀects are both nonnegative and one is strictly positive.
12to the market size and strategic entry deterrence motives would need to be tremendously
strong to make total advertising expenditures decreasing in market size over any range. It
is more plausible that there might be nonmonotonicities in per capita expenditures.
Remark 3: The proposition says nothing about what happens if the direct and com-
petition eﬀects go in opposite directions. Investment absent entry deterrence motives can
be nonmonotone in z in such applications, but there is no strong reason to think this will
usually be the case, e.g. it is not true that one eﬀect tends to dominate at small z and
the other at large z. It would not be unreasonable to look for evidence of strategic entry
deterrence by looking for nonmonotonicities even in the absence of a convincing argument
that the direct and competition eﬀects went in the same direction. One would, however,
need to recognize that one could fashion an alternate expanation for the nonmonotonicity
by having diﬀerent nonstrategic eﬀects dominate in diﬀerent regions, and one would want
to consider whether such an explanation is plausible.
One noteworthy special case in which the monotonicity argument is particularly simple
is when z is the number of potential consumers in the market and the proﬁt and cost
functions are directly proportional to z. In this case we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In the model above, suppose c(A,z) = zc(A,1) and π
j∗
i (A,z) = zπ
j∗
i (A,1) for
i = 1,2 and j = d,m. Then, the direct eﬀect is zero. Hence A∗
ND(z) will be monotone in-
creasing if the competition eﬀect is always positive and A∗
ND(z) will be monotone decreasing
if the competition eﬀect is always negative.
3.2 Examples of direct and competition eﬀects
In this section we discuss the direct and competition eﬀects in a few examples. The examples
are related to our pharmaceutical application, and are also intended to help build intuition
for the two eﬀects.
We already saw one numerical example of a situation in which investment absent entry
deterrence motives was monotone decreasing in the market size. Why the pattern of invest-
ment is as it is in this example is straightforward: The proﬁt and cost functions in example
1 satisfy the hypotheses of Corollary 1. The competition eﬀect is negative because the
13beneﬁt of the advertising is greater for a monopolist than for a duopolist. (The duopolist
gains less both because advertising has a smaller impact on consumers’ incremental prefer-
ence for the incumbent’s product relative to the entrant’s and because the incumbent has
a smaller market share in duopoly.)
Another useful example to think about is advertising that increases perceived diﬀeren-
tiation between the incumbent’s product and the entrant’s. With proportional advertising
costs we would again expect advertising levels in such models to be monotone. This time,
however, we would expect advertising to be monotone increasing: diﬀerentiating advertis-
ing is more valuable to a duopolist (which relies on diﬀerentiation to maintain markups)
than to a monopolist. Here is formal version:
Example 2 Diﬀerentiating advertising.
Consider a mass z of potential consumers with unit demands diﬀerentiated by a taste
parameter θ which is uniformly distributed on [−1,1]. Suppose that after ﬁrm 1 spends
zA2/2 on advertising, a consumer of type θ receives utility 1 − p1 if he buys the good from
ﬁrm 1 at price p1, 1+θt(1+A)−p2 if he buys from ﬁrm 2 at p2, and zero if he makes no
purchase.
With this speciﬁcation duopoly proﬁts are proportional to 1 + A and monopoly proﬁts
are independent of A. Hence, the competition eﬀect is positive. Again, there is no direct
eﬀect. Hence, A∗
ND(z) will be monotone increasing.
In this example, we would get the same result with another reasonable speciﬁcation for
advertising costs.
Example 3 Diﬀerentiating advertising via broadcast media.
Suppose that A represented total advertising expenditure in a model where the advertising
technology (perhaps like direct-to-consumer television advertising) is such that all potential
consumers see any ad, i.e., where c(A,z) = c(A,1) and π
j∗
i (A,z) = zπ
j∗
i (A,1).
In this case the direct eﬀect of z on A is positive so the direct and competition eﬀects
of diﬀerentiating advertising would work in the same direction.
Another type of investment we will think about in the pharmaceutical application is
investments in product proliferation.
14Example 4 Product proliferation.
Let z be the mass of potential consumers and let A be a ﬁxed expenditure on developing
new versions of the product to be located at various points of a horizontal taste space a la
Hotelling. Suppose that costs of developing these new varieties are independent of size of
the consumer population, c(A,z) = c(A,1). Suppose also that second stage monopoly proﬁts
are only slightly increasing in A (because idiosyncratic taste variation is small relative to
the value of the good), whereas duopoly proﬁts are more steeply increasing in A (because
product proliferation leads ﬁrm 2 upon entry to choose to compete directly with only a subset
of ﬁrm 1’s products).
In this example, A∗
ND(z) will again be monotone increasing. The direct eﬀect is positive:
the beneﬁts of an investment A are increasing in z whereas the costs are independent of z.
The competition eﬀect is positive because the marginal value of the investment is greater
for a duopolist.
4 Econometric issues
The theoretical results above illustrate a general idea: one could seek evidence that in-
vestment levels reﬂect a strategic entry-deterrence motive by ﬁrst arguing that investment
levels A should be monotone is a market size measure z absent entry-deterrence motives and
then showing that they are actually nonmonotone. To develop this idea into one on which
econometric tests can be based, the model obviously needs to be augmented to contain
an error term that can can account for measurement error in A, unobserved heterogeneity
across markets, etc. In this section, we review the existing literature on monotonicity tests,
describe the speciﬁc tests we will carry out on our data, and discuss additional econometric
issues relevant when one moves from the theory to applications.
4.1 Standard tests of monotonicity
Several recent papers have proposed tests of the hypothesis that data {Ai,zi} are generated
by a process
Ai = A∗(zi) + i,
15with A∗(z) being monotone increasing in z and the i being independent of zi. These
include Gijbels et al. (2000), Ghosal et al. (2000), and Hall and Heckman (2000). Hall
and Heckman’s approach is simple and intuitive: if the true A∗(z) is monotone increasing,
then it is unlikely that there will be large ranges of z over which the relationship between
Ai and zi appears to be decreasing. This motivates forming a test statistic by looking at
how strong of a downward relationship one can ﬁnd by considering all ranges R = [r1,r2]
containing at least m datapoints. Speciﬁcally, they propose estimating a linear regression
on the subset of the data with zi ∈ R for each such R and using the product of the regression
coeﬃcient ˆ βR and the sample standard deviation of the z’s in the range σR
z as a measure





They show that critical values can be obtained by a bootstrap with normal errors or by a
nonparametic bootstrap provided that m increases suﬃciently quickly in n.
4.2 Our implementation
In this paper we will test for monotonicity in two ways: one uses a slight modiﬁcation of
Hall and Heckman’s test statistic; the other uses a new statistic we propose.
Our modiﬁcation of Hall and Heckman’s test statistic is necessitated by the fact that
we want the null hypothesis to be that A∗(z) is monotone rather than monotone increasing.
To this end, we set







Intuitively, this will be large if there are both ranges over which the data are increasing
and ranges over which the data are decreasing.
The second test statistic we try assesses how well the data can be ﬁt by a monotone
function. Speciﬁcally, we use isotone regression to determine the monotone function ˆ f(z)
that best ﬁts the data, form the residuals ˆ i ≡ Ai− ˆ f(zi), and use a test statistic like that in









16where W is a kernel weight matrix reﬂecting diﬀerences in the z’s and W = (W + W0)/2.
Intuitively, if the true A∗(z) is nonmonotone, then there will be regions where A∗(z) > ˆ f(z)
and other regions where A∗(z) < ˆ f(z). This test looks for such regions by looking at whether
the residuals from nearby observations are positively correlated.
We obtained critical values for each of these tests via bootstrap methods. We have
not tried to extend the existing results to obtain formal proofs that that this procedure is
valid in our setting.12 We, therefore, conduct simulations to help assess the validity of the
procedure and the power of the tests. We discuss these brieﬂy in the appendix.13
4.3 Measurement error
A second issue that will come up in many applications is that one may have only an
imperfect proxy for “market size” z. For example, in a dataset examining a cross-section
of cities or countries, one would typically use population as a proxy for market size, which
would not allow for taste diﬀerences across markets.14 We note here that this is often not
a problem for our approach.
Suppose z is unobserved, but the data contain a proxy r correlated with z. Given
a dataset containing observations {Ai,ri} satisfying Ai = A∗(zi) + i and appropriate
regularity conditions, one can estimate the function A(r) deﬁned by A(r) ≡ E(A∗(z)|r).
Whether looking for nonmonotonicity remains an appropriate way to look for evidence
of strategic entry deterrence depends on whether A(r) inherits the monotonicity of A∗(z)
under the null.
Obviously, we can only hope that A(r) will be monotone in r if the joint distribution
of r and z is such that higher values of r are associated with higher values of z. It is a
standard result in incentive theory that the appropriate meaning of association for many
such problems is having the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). The conditional
12The theoretical results of Hall and Heckman (2000) cannot be applied directly for a couple reasons:
we have modiﬁed the test statistic to make it two-sided, and in some of our applications the A variable is
discrete, which does not ﬁt with their assumption that the i are i.i.d. The theoretical results in Ellison
and Ellison (2000) are inapplicable because it is assumed there that the function ˆ f(z) is obtained via a
parametric method, whereas the ˆ f(z) in this paper is a nonparametric estimate.
13In unreported simulations we also examined the power of the Ghosal et al. (2000) and Gijbels et al.
(2000) tests. We chose to use the two statistics we use because they were quicker to compute and/or more
powerful in these simulations.
14See Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube (2005) for an interesting study of cross-market taste diﬀerences.
17density f(x|θ) of a random variable is said to have the MLRP in x if f(x|θ)/f(x|θ) is
monotone increasing in x whenever θ > θ. Under this assumption we have
Proposition 2 Suppose A∗(z) is monotone in z. Suppose distribution of r conditional on
z has the MLRP in r. Then, A(r) is monotone in r.
Proof
MLRP implies that the distribution of z conditional on r is increasing in the ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance sense. (See Milgrom (1981).) This implies that the expectation
conditional on r of any increasing function of z is increasing in r. A(r) is the expectation
of A∗(z).
QED.
In the classic measurement error model, ri = zi + i, the MLRP holds provided that
the density g of  has g( − δ)/g() increasing in  for any δ > 0. This property, called
monotone likelihood ratio, holds for most standard distributions including the normal. We
therefore think of Proposition 2 as indicating that measurement error is not a signiﬁcant
obstacle to our approach.15
4.4 Endogeneity
In some applications, one may also worry that the available proxies for market size are en-
dogenous. For example, in our pharmaceutical application, our best proxy for the potential
market for a drug is the total revenue that the incumbent monopolist has been receiving
prior to patent expiration. This will be correlated with the number of potential consumers
and their aggregate willingness to pay for the drug, but one would also expect that it would
be inﬂuenced by the investments, e.g. revenue will be higher if the incumbent advertises
more.
Endogeneity is a more serious concern than measurement error. However, because we are
only interested in monotonicity (as opposed to obtaining consistent parameter estimates)
endogeneity can be less of a problem for our approach than it would be for structural
15The textbook example of a situation in which the property fails is when the distribution of i is extremely
bimodal. For example, if z is standard normal and  is always either -10 or 10, then observing r = −9 likely
indicates that z = 1, whereas observing r = 9 likely indicates that z = −1.
18estimation. One can easily envision two situations in which the use of an endogenous
proxy without an instrument would not be a problem. First, if the endogeneity bias in
estimating ∂A/∂z is of the same sign as ∂A/∂z, then investments will still be estimated
to be monotone in the endogenous variable under the null. The power of our test may be
reduced, but a rejection of monotonicity would still be evidence of strategic entry deterrence
motives. Second, if the endogeneity bias is of the opposite sign as ∂A/∂z but is suﬃciently
small, then the estimated investment function would also still be monotone under the null.
Formally, consider again a cross-section dataset containing investment levels Ai and a
proxy ri for the market size. Suppose the data generating process is
Ai = A∗(zi) + i
ri = r(zi,Ai) + ηi,
where zi, i, and ηi are unobserved independent random variables and r(z,A) is a function
that is monotone increasing in both arguements. Again, the function one can hope to
estimate from the data is A(r) ≡ E(A∗(z) + |r).
Deﬁne ˜ r(z,) ≡ r(z,A∗(z) + ). One result showing that endogeneity need not be a
problem is straightforward.
Proposition 3 Suppose A∗(z) is monotone increasing. Suppose the distribution of η has
a monotone likelihood ratio, and that the distributions of ˜ r(z,) conditional on z and  both
have the MLRP in ˜ r. Then, A(r) is monotone increasing in r.
Proof
When η has a monotone likelihood ratio, the distribution of ˜ r(z,) is increasing in r
in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance (FOSD). When the distributions of ˜ r(z,)
conditioned on each argument both have the MLRP, this in turn implies that the distri-
butions of z and  are both increasing in r in the FOSD sense. When A∗(z) is monotone
increasing, this implies that the distribution of A∗(z) +  is increasing in r in the FOSD
sense, which implies that A(r) is increasing.
QED.
19Proposition 3 has two primary limitations. The most important limitation for applied
work is that it only covers the case in which A∗(z) is monotone increasing, not to the case
when A∗(z) is monotone decreasing.
A second limitation is that we have assumed that ˜ r(z,) has the MLRP in both argu-
ments. If r(z,A) is linear in its arguments, then one of these assumptions is simply that
the distribution of  has a monotone likelihood ratio. The other is that the distribution of
z + βA∗(z) has a monotone likelihood ratio. Even if z is normally distributed, one could
ﬁnd monotone functions A∗(z) for which z + βA∗(z) has a bimodal distribution (choose
a function with two broad ﬂat portions separated by a steeper portion). This seems less
important as a practical concern.
If A∗(z) is monotone decreasing the argument in the proof of Proposition 3 goes through
until the very last step.16 It does not go all the way through because we end up with
E(A∗(z)|r) decreasing in r and E(|r) increasing in r, leaving the sum E(A∗(z)+|r) inde-
terminate. In some applications with A∗(z) monotone decreasing it will still be appropriate
to interpret a test of whether A∗(r) is nonmonotonic as a test for strategic entry deterrence.
This would be justiﬁed in applications for which the A∗(z) decreasing eﬀect should outweigh
the E(|r) increasing eﬀect. The former eﬀect will be stronger than the latter when r(z,A)
is more dependent on z than A, when the variance of z is large relative to the variance in
, and when A∗(z) is more steeply downward sloping.
5 The Pharmaceutical Industry
In this section we provide some background on the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, discuss
strategic instruments that ﬁrms might try to use to deter generic entry, describe our dataset,
and note that the dataset has the type of heterogeneity in “market size” required for our
approach.
16The assumption that ˜ r(z,) has the MLRP in both arguments may also be more diﬃcult to justify. For
larger values of ˜ r to be associated with larger values of z we will need d˜ r/dz to be positive, which requires
that the direct eﬀect dr/dz is larger than the indirect eﬀect through investment levels dr/dA dA
∗/dz.
205.1 Industry background
Prior to 1984 all but the most popular drugs tended to retain their monopoly position in
the U.S. market long after their patent protection expired. FDA reguations required any
ﬁrm wanting to produce a generic substitute to repeat the lengthy process of tests and
clinical trials to which the incumbent had been subjected. Things changed dramatically
in the mid-1980’s: the Waxman-Hatch Act (1984) reduced regulatory barriers to generic
entry; and state laws mandating/allowing generic substitution by pharmacists boosted the
market share of generic drugs.17
When a blockbuster drug like Prozac loses patent protection, generic entry is swift and
sure—within 18 months Prozac faced 21 generic competitors and had lost more than 80%
of its market. Most drugs, however, are not blockbusters. Many FDA-approved drugs
never achieve much commercial success. Others have been largely supplanted by the time
they lose protection. In this paper, we study a set of 63 drugs that lost patent or FDA
exclusivity protection between 1986 and 1992.18 Whereas Prozac had annual revenues of
about $3 billion prior to patent expiration, the median drug in our sample only had annual
revenue of around $20 million. For such a drug, generic entry is much less certain: only
thirty seven of the sixty three drugs in our sample faced generic competitors within three
years of the expiration of their patents.
There are a number of “investments” that one could imagine pharmaceutical incum-
bent distorting in order to deter entry. The most obvious is advertising, which plays an
extremely important role in pharmaceutical markets—an oft-cited statistic by critics of the
17See Grabowski and Vernon (1996).
18These drugs are a subset of those used in Scott Morton (2000). The sample is intended to be an
as-complete-as-possible list of the drugs that lost patent protection in this period, although we were con-
servative in constructing the sample and only included drugs when we were suﬃciently conﬁdent about the
identiﬁcation of the relevant patent and exclusivity restrictions. This can be diﬃcult even though drug
manufacturers are required by the FDA to report all relevant patents with expiration dates and the FDA
publishes this information in the Approved Product List (“The Orange Book”). The reason is that which
patents are truly relevant is not something the FDA can sort out, and it is clearly in the interests of the man-
ufacturers to list patents even if their relevance is questionable. For the high revenue drugs, potential entry
dates are often listed in trade publications and are, therefore, fairly easy to track down, absent court battles
over expiration. Information is more diﬃcult to come by for the smaller revenue drugs because potential
entry into those drugs is usually not an important event. For those we relied more on FDA publications.
Additional sources we used were lists of patent expiration dates published by the Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry Association and Arthur D. Little, Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz (1991), lists of ANDAs, and
information on generics being produced in various issues of Drug Facts and Comparisons.
21pharmaceutical industry is that more money is spent by the industry on marketing than
on research and development.19 In the period we study, there were two main advertising
channels: “detail” and journal advertising.20 Detail advertising is the practice of having
sales representatives visit doctors’ oﬃces to inform them about studies assessing a drug’s
eﬀectiveness and otherwise promote the product in one-on-one conversations. Journal ad-
vertising means placing advertisements in medical journals and other publications read by
doctors. Expenditures on detail advertising are typically much larger than expenditures on
journal advertising. An important aspect of both of these advertising technologies is that
increases in demand they generate will in part be captured by generic competitors: doctors
will know that generic versions of a drug can provide the same beneﬁts; and pharmacists
may dispense a generic even when the doctor has written a prescription for a brand name.
A second potential instrument for strategic entry deterrence that has received much less
attention is presentation proliferation. Many prescription drugs are sold in a large number
of “presentations”. The tranquilizer Haldol, for example, is sold in 1
2, 1, 2, 5, 10 and 20
milligram tablets, as a concentrated liquid in bottles, and as a solution for intravenous use
in vials, ampules and disposable syringes. Increasing the variety of presentations could be
a strategy for deterring entry. It makes it more costly for an entrant to reproduce the
incumbent’s complete product line, and reduces the revenues of an entrant that avoids the
cost increase by only producing some presentations.
An additional instrument that ﬁrms might use to deter entry is pricing. The theoretical
literature has identiﬁed a number of ways in which pricing decisions may aﬀect subsequent
entry: prices may signal something about the incumbent or the market to the entrant, they
may be be distorted for signal jamming reasons, or there may be some more direct link
between periods due to switching costs, learning by doing, etc.21 In the pharmaceutical
19See U.S. Congress, Oﬃce of Technology Assessment (1993). Bill Clinton, in a 1993 speech, said that
the pharmaceutical industry spends “$1 billion more each year on advertising and lobbying than it does
on developing new and better drugs . . . . We cannot have proﬁts at the expense of our children.” (The
Wall Street Journal, February 16, 1993) Schweitzer (1997) provides a thorough discussion of research and
marketing expenditures of pharmaceutical ﬁrms. See Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz (1991), Hurwitz and
Caves (1988), Leﬄer (1981), Berndt, Bui, Reiley, and Urban (1995) and Rizzo (1999) for discussions of other
aspects of pharmaceutical advertising.
20Direct-to-consumer advertising via mass media did not begin in earnest until the mid 1990’s. See
Rosenthal et al. (2002) for a description of the practice and some documentation of its prevalence.
21Among the early papers in this literature are Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983b,
22industry it is plausible that generic entrants have some uncertainty about the slope of the
demand curve, and also plausible that prices may have some commitment value due to the
scrutiny directed at price increases. Hence, several of the mechanisms by which prices could
be a strategic investment seem potentially relevant.
5.2 Data
Our basic data set includes 63 distinct chemical compounds that faced potential generic
entry as the result of a patent or FDA exclusivity expiration between 1986 and 1992.22
We collected the data on revenues, prices, and advertising from historical IMS audits
of the pharmaceutical industry. Like all IMS sales data, the prices and revenues are those
paid by the retail or hospital sector, in other words, essentially at the wholesale level. Our
revenue data contain annual presentation-level wholesale revenues for all presentations of
each drug in both the hospital and drugstore submarkets for ﬁve years: three years prior to
patent expiration, the year of patent expiration and the year following patent expiration.
We construct two variables from this data which we use to help measure the attractiveness
of the market to potential entrants: Revenue3 is the average annual revenue (in thousands
of dollars) from hospital and drugstore sales in the three calendar years before but not
including the year of patent expiration; and HospFrac is the fraction of total revenues in
the calendar year prior to patent expiration which were due to hospital sales. All prices
and revenues are in constant 1982-1984 dollars.
Our advertising data on each drug consist of two variables, Detail and Journal. The
former is the number of minutes that pharmaceutical company “detailers” spent promoting
the drug in direct conversations with physicians. The latter is an estimate of dollars spent
on journal advertisements promoting the drug based on audits of medical journals. The
advertising data is at a monthly frequency and includes 48 observations per drug covering
the thirty six months prior to patent expiration, the month of patent expiration and the
eleven subsequent months.
1986), Harrington (1986), and Klemperer (1987).
22Our data set contains 71 drugs, where a drug is deﬁned as a brand-name product sold by the patent-
holder or licensee prior to expiration. Seven of our chemical compounds were sold under multiple brand-
names, accounting for the discrepency.
23Our primary measure of the degree to which an incumbent has engaged in presentation
proliferation, PresHerf, is a Herﬁndahl-style measure that is also constructed from the
presentation-level revenue data. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne PresHerfit = wi
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ihkt, where wi is the fraction of the sales of drug i which are made through drug-
stores and zidkt and zihkt are the fractions of drug i’s revenues in year t in the drugstore
and hospital markets, respectively, which are accounted for by presentation k.23 PresHerf
will be large in markets where a small number of presentations account for most of the rev-
enues and smaller in markets where sales are more evenly divided among a larger number
of presentations.
Because of the diﬀerent presentations, a drug’s price is diﬃcult to deﬁne. (Prices for
diﬀerent presentations are clearly not set to equalize the total cost of a duration of treatment
or in proportion to the quantity of the active ingredient.) In our study of pricing patterns,
we look at changes in the drugstore and hospital prices of each drug using variables, HPrice
and DPrice, which give the price of one particular presentation of each drug in the ﬁve
year window around the year of patent expiration.24
We obtained information on drug characteristics and whether generic entry did in fact
occur from several other sources.25 The primary variable we will use to study entry,
Entry3Y r, is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one ﬁrm had an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) approved (allowing it to produce a generic version of the drug)
within three years of the date at which a patent expires.26 Chronic is set to zero for drugs
23Deﬁning presentations by diﬀerences at the wholesale level will in some cases be a poor reﬂection of how
proliferation aﬀects the costs of entry. For example, 100mg tablets sold to pharmacies in a 100 tablet bottle
will be treated as diﬀerent from 100mg tablets sold in bubble packs and as diﬀerent from 100mg tablets
sold to pharmacies in a 500 tablet bottle. The descriptors in our data at times do not make it clear how
similar/diﬀerent wholesale presentations are, but it did not appear that problems like those described above
are very important in the aggregate.We would also have preferred to sum the presentation-by-presentation
revenues across hospitals and drugstores before computing the sum of squares, but given the form of our
data, this would have entailed a laborious manual matching. Given that 70 percent of the drugs have at
least 90 percent of their sales in one submarket or the other, we felt that just taking weighted averages was
a reasonable compromise.
24We usually chose the presentation that had the highest revenue in the ﬁrst year of our data.
25These include Drug Facts and Comparisons, Physician’s Desk Reference, the FDA’s Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, and discussions with physicians.
26Caves, Whinston and Hurwicz (1991) and Scott Morton (1999) note that entry in pharmaceutical
markets often does not occur immediately upon patent expiration, and that only part of the delay in
attributable to uncertainties in the length of time necessary for ANDA approval.
24which treat an acute condition and to one for drugs which treat a chronic condition.27
Psych is an indicator for whether the drug primarily treats a psychological condition.
Topical is an indicator for whether the drug is usually applied topically. TherSubs is the
number of other chemical compounds in a drug’s therapeutic class, where we used therapeu-
tic categories deﬁned by Drug Facts and Comparisons. Specialist is a proxy for the extent
to which the drug tends to be prescribed by specialists. It is obtained by computing the
GINI coeﬃcient for each therapeutic class of drugs from a table of frequency of prescription
by various specialties. Cardiovascular drugs, for instance, have a GINI coeﬃcient of 0.18
whereas ophthalmic drugs have a value of 0.35, indicating that prescriptions for cardiovas-
culars are more spread out across specialties than are prescriptions for ophthalmics. (Those
two categories represent the minimum and maximum values.) Each drug is categorized in
therapeutic class and assigned the GINI coeﬃcient for its therapeutic class as its value of
Specialist.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. The ﬁrst ﬁve variables in the table are
deﬁned at the drug level. The mean of the Entry3Y r variable reﬂects that 37 of the 63
drugs experienced generic entry in the three year window. The mean of the Revenue3
variable indicates that the average drug had annual revenues of $39.4 million.
Detail3 and Journal3 are average annual values of the advertising variables over the
same three-year pre-expiration period for which Revenue3 was computed. The values for
the mean advertising ratios in Table 3 indicate that 1.4% of sales were spent on journal
advertising and approximately 5% on detail advertising.28 PresHerf3 is an average of the
PresHerf variable over the same three year period.29 Although the average number of
presentations per drug is greater than six, the mean value of 0.54 indicates that one or two
presentations usually account for a large portion of revenues.30 The Detail3, Journal3, and
PresHerf3 variables have 69 or 70 observations rather than 63 because we have deﬁned
27The variable is set to one-half for a few drugs which were judged to be intermediate on this dimension.
28Our detailing data are in minutes. This calculation assumes a cost of $10 a minute.
29For seven of the drugs we are missing data for one of the three years. In these cases, the average was
taken over the two years for which data was available.
30Recall that the scale of a Herﬁndahl index is such that the index would be equal to 1/n if a drug is sold
in n presentations and each receives equal revenues. Ten of our drugs are sold in a single presentation and
hence have PresHerf3 equal to one. The mean of PresHerf3 for the remaining drugs is still 0.46.
25them at the level of the brand-name rather than at the level of the drug.31
The DPricet and HPricet variables are yearly observations of the price of one presen-
tation of each drug deﬂated by the Consumer Price Index. The summary statistics indicate
that the average price increases in the drugstore and hospital markets are 1% and 1.9%
above the rate of inﬂation.
The data on the HospFrac variable reﬂect that drugstore revenues are usually substan-
tially larger than hospital revenues.
5.3 Revenue as a proxy for market size
Our approach to studying stategic investment requires that we have a proxy for “market
size”. and that there be suﬃcient heterogeneity in this variable. In this section, we note
that pre-expiration revenues should be a good market-size proxy.
Previous work by Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Bae (1987), and Scott Morton (2000)
has established that pre-expiration revenues are a signiﬁcant predictor of generic entry. This
should not be surprising: there is tremendous variation in revenues across drugs and no
obvious reason why the ﬁxed costs of developing drugs should be comparably heterogeneous
and correlated. The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports estimates from a probit regression of
Entry3Y r on Revenue3 to verify that such a relationship exists in our data as well. The
second column adds several other covariates to the regression. None except Revenue3 have
a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of generic entry.32
One can only expect to be able to ﬁnd a nonmonotonic investment pattern in the cross-
section due to strategic investment if the heterogeneity in market sizes is suﬃciently large
so that a dataset contains markets where the likelihood of entry is small, intermediate, and
31Hence, the seven drugs that are sold under multiple brand names contribute multiple observations to
these regressions. The small number of missing observations are due to cases where we judged the data to
be unreliable. Drugs for which no detail or journal advertising was performed are included and coded as
zeros.
32The point estimates are that drugs treating chronic conditions and drugs sold mostly through hospitals
were more likely to face generic entry, although neither estimate is signiﬁcant even at the 10% level. We
would also ﬁnd such estimates a bit surprising as they do not conform with intuitive ﬁndings in the previous
literature about where markups are greatest: Sorensen’s (2000) study of dispersion in retail drug prices
in New York State indicates that drugs treating acute conditions have higher retail markups (and less
dispersion), and Ellison and Snyder (2001) and others report that hospitals pay lower wholesale prices for
antibiotics than do drugstores. Scott Morton (2000) does report that entry is signiﬁcantly more likely for
drugs treating chronic conditions and for drugs where the hospital share of sales is larger in her analysis of
a larger dataset which overlaps substantially with ours.
26large. To give some feel for the degree of heterogeneity in our data, we divide our sample
into ﬁve revenue-based subsamples. Table 4 reports the range of revenues in each group
and the fraction of drugs in each group that experienced entry within three years of patent
expiration.33 The main observation to be taken away from this table is that one can think
of the lowest quintile, Q1, as containing drugs that face a low probability of generic entry,
those in the next quintile, Q2, as having an intermediate probability of generic entry, and
those in the top three quintiles, Q3, Q4 and Q5, as having a high probability of generic
entry. The strategic entry-deterrence motive will vary continuously with revenues (and
other unobservables), but one can roughly regard it as being most salient for drugs in the
second-lowest revenue quintile.
6 Evidence on Strategic Investment in Pharmaceuticals
In this section we examine our data on detail advertising, journal advertising, presentation
proliferation, and pricing for evidence that the incumbents’ actions reﬂect a strategic entry
deterrence motive. We will do this in two ways. First, in the most straightforward appli-
cation of the framework developed in this paper we look for evidence of nonmonotonicity
in the cross-section. Second, we conduct a similar analysis using behavior in the early part
of our data (when entry deterrence was less salient) as an additional control variable.
6.1 Cross-sectional patterns in incumbent behavior
In our theory section we presented conditions under which investment would be monotone
in market size if ﬁrms are not inﬂuenced by an entry-deterrence motive, and noted that a
strong entry-deterrence motive might be expected to produce a nonmonotone pattern. We
now discuss the potentially strategic actions one by one. In each case, we discuss what
might be expected absent entry deterrence motives, how behavior would be distorted to
deter entry, and what patterns are observed in our dataset. We ﬁnd some evidence in favor
of the entry-deterrence hypothesis in the journal advertising data.
33Note that the ﬁve “quintiles” in this table contain uneven numbers of drugs. Recall that we are
sometimes treating our sample as 63 drugs and sometimes as 69 brand names/drug combinations. We do
the latter more frequently, and hence chose to deﬁne the quintiles to have the same number of brand names
in each. Note that the quintiles are only being used to provide a feel for the data and our nonparametric
monotonicity tests do not involve any arbitrary cutoﬀs.
276.1.1 Detail advertising
Detail advertising is extremely important in the development of the market for a prescrip-
tion drug. Our cross-sectional analysis will examine advertising-to-sales ratios.34 What
patterns might be indicative of strategic entry deterrence? Absent entry-deterrence mo-
tives we would expect to see these ratios decline slightly with market size. The “compe-
tition eﬀect” is that there are reduced long-run beneﬁts to advertising high-revenue drugs
approaching patent expiration (because a substantial share of future prescriptions will in-
stead go to generics). There is little “direct eﬀect” because the fact that detailing eﬀorts are
focused on doctors who write a substantial number of prescriptions for a condition means
that they are not particularly less productive for drugs that treat less common conditions.
In a strategic-entry-deterrence model the strategic eﬀect is that an incumbent might reduce
detail advertising levels in intermediate sized markets. This reduction in advertising would
reduce the attractiveness of the market to potential entrants, and entry could thereby be
deterred.




= β0 + β1 log(Revenue3i) + β2(log(Revenue3i) − R)2 + β3Specialisti + i,
where R is the mean of log(Revenue3). We include Specialisti because detailing is more
cost-eﬀective for drugs prescribed by specialists than for drugs prescribed by nonspecialists
(each of whom will only have a small number of patients who could beneﬁt from the drug).
Coeﬃcient estimates are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 6. The regression does
not provide any evidence for a nonmonotonic pattern. Indeed, it provides little evidence
of any patterns at all. The R2 of the regression is low. The coeﬃcient estimates on the
revenue variables and the coeﬃcient estimate on the Specialist variable are all statistically
insigniﬁcant.
Table 7 presents additional descriptive evidence and formal tests for nonmonotonicity.
The ﬁrst ﬁve columns of the ﬁrst row of the table give the mean values of Detail3/Revenue3
34For drugs sold under multiple brand names our advertising data is at the level of the brand rather than
the drug. In these cases, we use brand-speciﬁc sales in the advertising to sales ratios.
28within each of the revenue quintiles. The most noteworthy value is the low value for the
second quintile, which, as noted earlier, can be thought of as drugs facing an intermediate
probability of generic entry. To provide formal tests of nonmonotonicity we carried out the
tests described in section 4.2. We used a parameter for the Hall-Heckman test corresponding
to subregressions of ﬁfteen observations. We set the smoothing parameter for the Ellison-
Ellison style test to be equal to one-ﬁfth of the support of the regressor. The sixth and
seventh columns of the Table report estimated p-values for these two tests, neither of
which rejects monotonicity at standard levels of signiﬁcance. Apparently, the level of noise
is suﬃciently high and/or the pattern is suﬃciently sensitive to the cutoﬀs so that the
nonmonotonic pattern in the quintile means is not signiﬁcant in our nonparametric tests.
6.1.2 Journal advertising
The second potential instrument for strategic entry deterrence available to us is journal
advertising. What patterns might be expected here with and without strategic entry de-
terrence?
The direct eﬀect should tend to make advertising-to-sales ratios increasing in revenues:
many medical journals reach a fairly wide audience, so the cost per potential patient of
journal advertising is probably decreasing in the size of the pool of potential patients. The
competition eﬀect should go in the other direction for the same reason as it did with detail
advertising. The fact that the two eﬀects go in opposite directions makes this a less than
ideal application for our methodology, although we would expect that the direct eﬀect
would outweigh the competition eﬀect and produce a monotone increasing pattern absent
entry-deterrence motivations.
The prediction of the strategic-entry-deterrence model is as in the detail advertising case:
ﬁrms should reduce advertising in intermediate-sized markets to reduce the attractiveness
of the market to potential entrants.
The second column of Table 6 reports estimates from a regression of Journal3/Revenue3
on log(Revenue3), (log(Revenue3)−R)2 and Specialist. The positive coeﬃcient on log(Revenue3)
suggests that advertising-to-sales ratios are higher in larger markets, but this coeﬃcient and
all the others are not signiﬁcant. The R2 is again low.
29The quintile means reported in the second row of Table 7 indicate that journal ad-
vertising is also lowest in the second quintile. This time, the Hall-Heckman test rejects
monotonicity at the 5% level.
We would summarize these results by saying that they suggest that there is evidence of
nonmonoticity in the relationship between journal advertising and market size. The form
of the nonmonotonicity is consistent with what one would expect from an entry-deterrence
model. We should note, however, that one could also tell a nonstrategic story: it could be
that the competition eﬀect dominates in small markets whereas economies of scale drive
the cross-sectional pattern in large markets.
6.1.3 Presentation proliferation
The ﬁnal incumbent action we examine in this section is presentation proliferation. As
noted above, the entry-deterrence motive gives incumbents in intermediate-sized markets
an incentive to increase the number of presentations in which the drug is sold. This makes
it more costly for entrants to match the incumbents’ full product line (or leaves entrants
with a lower market share if they enter with a limited product line). This would be reﬂected
in a reduction in our Herﬁndahl-style measure, PresHerf3, in intermediate-sized markets.
This again is a not an ideal application because there are eﬀects going in both directions.
There should be a strong negative “direct eﬀect” because the ﬁxed costs of developing a
new presentation can be spread over a larger quantity of sales in large markets. The
“competition eﬀect” likely goes in the opposite direction because the incumbent has lower
sales in a duopoly. We would anticipate, however, that the latter is likely to be smaller, so
we are comfortable applying our tests assuming that a monotone decreasing relationship
would be most likely absent entry-deterrence motives.
The third column of Table 6 reports coeﬃcient estimates from a regression of PresHerf3
on log(Revenue3), (log(Revenue3) − ¯ R)2, and two control variables. There is clearly
a strong relationship between presentation proliferation and revenues: the coeﬃcient on
log(Revenue3) is negative and highly signiﬁcant. The quadratic term yields no evidence of
nonmontonicity. The control variables, Psych and Topical, are also highly signiﬁcant.35
35Psychoactive drugs tend to be oﬀered in a much wider range of dosages than other drugs and topical
medications tend to have a large number of presentations both because of variation in the dosage and
30Table 7 similarly gives no indication of a nonmonotone pattern. The quintile means are
montonically decreasing. The p-values for the two monotonicity tests are 0.34 and 0.19.
We would summarize these results by saying that they suggest that there is a strong
direct eﬀect of market size on presentation proliferation. Our approach will have less power
to detect strategic entry deterrence when direct eﬀects are larger. The cross-section data on
presentation proliferation appear to be a case where our approach will have limited power.
6.2 Changes in behavior as expiration approaches
In this section we exploit an additional feature the pharmaceutical environment—entry is
prohibited until a known point in time—to construct additional tests for strategic entry
deterrence. We ﬁnd additional evidence of nonmonotonicities.
One can think of the analysis in the previous subsection as examining a cross-section




ND(zi)) + ηi + it,
where we have broken the equilibrium behavior A∗(zi) into two components: the behav-
ior that would have been optimal if ﬁrms ignored the strategic entry-deterrence motive,
A∗
ND(zi), and the pure strategic term, A∗
ED(zi) − A∗
ND(zi), multiplied by a coeﬃcient γt,
which would take on the value of one if ﬁrms fully recognized and reacted to the strate-
gic entry-deterrence motive, and zero in the other extreme where ﬁrms do not recognize
this incentive or choose not to reaspond to it. Writing the equation this way highlights
two reasons why it might be diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence of strategic entry deterrence in a
pure cross-section dataset. First, if A∗
ND(zi) is steeply sloped, then this may overwhelm
the nonomonotonicity of the strategic term γt(A∗
ED(zi) − A∗
ND(zi)) and leave us with no
nonmonotonicity to detect. Second, even if this is not the case, the error terms due to
drug-speciﬁc heterogeneity and noise, ηi and it, may be large enough to make it hard to
provide signiﬁcant evidence from small sample sizes.
Suppose that one also had the opportunity to observe each market at two points in
time: a time t when the incumbent invested as above and a second point in time t0 when
because they may be oﬀered as creams, liquids, gels, etc. in diﬀerent-sized tubes.




ND(zi)) + ηi + it0,
with γt0 < γt. The diﬀerence between the two observations would then be given by
Ait − Ait0 = (γt − γt0)(A∗
ED(zi) − A∗
ND(zi)) + it − it0.
Detecting nonmonotone pattern in this equation could be much easier: the potentially
steeply sloped nonstrategic term has been eliminated, and the error variance may be smaller.
In our pharmaceutical application, generic entry is prohibited until a known date. Fur-
ther in advance of this date, the entry deterrence motive should be weaker, e.g. if the rate
at which advertising goodwill decays is such that advertising today will have only a trivial
impact on demand at the patent-expiration date, then the incentive to distort advertising
will be very weak. Of course, if one looks much further from the patent expiration date it
becomes less plausible that the nonstrategic optimum, A∗
ND(zi), and the drug-spciﬁc het-
erogeneity ηi, are really the same at the two points in time, e.g. ﬁrms advertise much more
when launching a new drug than in subsequent years. To balance these two considerations,
we examine here the diﬀerence between ﬁrm behavior in the year immediately prior to
patent expiration and ﬁrm behavior in the preceding two years.36
In the subsections that follow, we examine whether changes in each of the potential
“strategic investments” are nonmontone in market size. For these tests, we drop all ob-
servations for which there is no change in incumbent behavior, e.g. drugs which do zero
advertising in both years and drugs that are only ever oﬀered in a single presentation. Our
primary dependent variable is an indicator variable for the behavior having increased or
decreased. This makes the comparisons as simple as possible and eliminates problems due
to outliers and heteroskedasticity.
6.2.1 Detail advertising
Recall that a strategic entry-deterrence model predicts that ﬁrms in intermediate-sized mar-
kets would reduce their detail advertising to make their market less attractive to potential
36In the case of the advertising variables, which are available to us at monthly frequency, we do this
by comparing the twelve months prior to patent expiration with the preceding twenty-four months. Our
presentation and pricing data are at an annual frequency, and we compare the calendar year prior to
expiration with the two previous calendar years.
32entrants. We did not see evidence of such a pattern in our cross-section analysis of detail
advertising, though.
For a ﬁrst look at the question of which ﬁrms are increasing and decreasing detail
advertising prior to patent expiration, the ﬁrst row of Table 8 reports the fraction of each
drugs in each revenue quintile that increased their detail advertising in the year prior to
patent expiration. (The row below this lists the number of drugs remaining in each quintile
after we dropped drugs that did no detail advertising at all in the thirty-six months prior
to patent expiriation.) Note that a pattern roughly consistent with the entry-deterrence
model is again visible: the majority of drugs in the smallest- and largest-revenue quintile
are increasing detailing as patent expiration approaches; while most drugs in the second-
and third quintiles (which are the ones where entry is most uncertain) are decreasing detail
advertising. Although the sample sizes behind some of these numbers are small (and one
could have worried that the stark numbers in the table were sensitive to the arbitrary bin
cutoﬀs), we are able to strongly reject monotonicity with the nonparametric Ellison-Ellison
style test.
We conclude that when we examine detail advertising changes prior to patent expiration
instead of levels, there is evidence of strategic entry-deterrence: ﬁrms in intermediate-sized
markets are reducing detail advertising prior to patent expiration.
6.2.2 Journal advertising
The strategic use of journal advertising is similar: ﬁrms in intermediate-sized markets
would reduce journal advertising to deter entry. The second row of Table 8 indicates that
reducing journal advertising is most common among ﬁrms in the third revenue-quintile.
Neither of the nonparametric tests ﬁnds the departure from monotonicity to be signiﬁcant
at reasonable levels, though.
We conclude with a mixed message. Our cross-section analysis found evidence that
journal advertising was being altered for entry-deterrence reasons. Looking at changes in
journal advertising as patent expiration approaches, though, does not provide additional
evidence of this strategic behavior.
336.2.3 Presentation proliferation
The potential strategic use of presentation proliferation is that ﬁrms in intermediate-sized
markets could try to deter entry by introducing more presentations. This would mean that
our PresHerf measure of presentation dispersion would be lower in these markets.
The quintile means reported in the third main row of Table 8 suggest the possibility
of nonmonotonicity, but the evidence is not conclusive. The Hall-Heckman test indicates a
departure from monotonicity signiﬁcant at about the 8% level.
We conclude that looking at how ﬁrms change their behavior in the year prior to patent
expiration yields some additional weaker evidence that ﬁrms might be inﬂuenced by a
strategic entry-deterrence motive, this time in the context of presentation proliferation.
6.2.4 Pricing
Pricing is an area in which looking at changes in behavior has the largest incremental ben-
eﬁt. We did not attempt to discuss strategic pricing at all in our cross-section analysis
because it is hard to normalize prices in any way that makes comparisons across drugs
meaningful.37 Looking at whether ﬁrms are increasing or decreasing prices as patent expi-
ration approaches, in constrast, is both simple and sensible.
What patterns might one see if pricing decisions are inﬂuenced by an entry deterrence
motive? As mentioned above, in the simplest limit-pricing models, ﬁrms set low prices
to deter entry, and this is eﬀective because ﬁrms are somehow committed to these prices.
This story could make sense in the pharmaceutical industry, with government or public
scrutiny being the external force that makes raising prices costly. With regard to the various
signalling and signal-jamming theories of strategic pricing, our discussions with industry
sources suggest that generic ﬁrms are well-informed about both prices and revenues (and
indeed have all the same data we have). Generic ﬁrms are less likely to be well informed
about price elasticities. Hence, it might be plausible to imagine that ﬁrms could choose
prices that are too low from the perspective of static proﬁt maximization in order to convince
37What one would want for a study of strategic pricing is to look at each drug’s price relative to the level
that would be optimal absent entry-deterrence motives, but any normalization of this kind would require
much more information than is available to us, e.g. one would want to estimate own-price elasticities for
each drug.
34generic entrants that elasticities are such that it will be proﬁtable for them to continue
to charge low prices after generic entry. In summary, the most plausible applications of
strategic pricing models suggest that ﬁrms in intermediate-sized markets might distort
prices downward to deter entry.38
The fourth row of Table 8 reports the frequency with which ﬁrms in each quintile are
raising prices charged to drugstores in the year before patent expiration.39 The quintiles
suggest some nonmonotonicity, but the formal nonparametric tests do not ﬁnd it to be
signiﬁcant.
The ﬁfth row repeats this exercise for hospital prices. Here, the general pattern is that
price increases are more common in the higher-revenue quintiles and the monotonicity tests
indicate that there is no signiﬁcant evidence of nonmonotonicity.
7 Conclusion
The expiration of a pharmaceutical patent and the subsequent opening of a drug market to
potential entrants is a momentous event for pharmaceutical ﬁrms. In this paper we have
examined how a number of ﬁrms have set prices, chosen advertising levels, and adjusted
their presentation-level product mix at this time. In some cases, we have found evidence of
nonmonotonic patterns that suggest that incumbents’ actions may be motivated in part by a
desire to deter generic entry. We found some evidence of nonmonotonic behavior in journal
advertising in the cross-section and of detail advertising and presentation proliferation in
changes before patent expiration. One possible interpretation of this pattern of results
is that journal advertising is considered to be a longer-lived investment than the other
two strategic tools, so that any strategic use of journal advertising could precede patent
38Incumbents distorting their prices down in advance of entry might also provide an additional explanation
for the much talked about observation that incumbents sometimes raise prices following generic entry. See
Masson and Steiner (1985), Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991), Grabowski
and Vernon (1992) and Griliches and Cockburn (1994). One situation in which the opposite distortion in
prices might be expected is when the incumbent also sells another product in the therapeutic category that
has a greater remaining patent life. In such a situation, a strategy for dealing with generic entry which has
been mentioned to us is to try to induce consumers of the product with the expiring patent to switch to the
other product. One way to do this is to raise the price of the older product.
39To be precise, the table reports the fraction of drugs for which the real price was higher in the year
immediately prior to patent expiration than it was, on average, in the two previous years. Note that not all
drugs in our sample were sold in both hospitals and drugstores.
35expiration by a relatively long time.
From a practical perspective, it should be pointed out that the entry-deterring behavior
we identify is not in blockbuster drugs—it occurs for more obscure drugs with relatively
low revenues. This is a result of our empirical strategy, and should not be interpreted as
a suggestion that strategic behavior is more common in these incumbents than in incum-
bents with blockbuster drugs. On the contrary, the fact that these incumbents seem to
have ﬁgured out the potential gains from altering future competitive conditions on these
unimportant drugs would lead one to assume that ﬁrms are also strategically sophisticated
with regard to their more important products.
More generally, this is a paper about the testing of strategic entry-deterrence theories.
Strategic investment models have become widespread in industrial organization, strategic
management, and other ﬁelds over the last two decades. Empirical analyses of such mod-
els should be useful for diverse reasons: from a behavioral perspective one could wonder
whether ﬁrms have ﬁgured out the sometimes subtle eﬀects; and regulators may be inter-
ested in whether ﬁrms are actively trying to deter entry. Direct tests of strategic intent are
made diﬃcult by the need to precisely estimate long run elasticities and to consider the
value of investments in alternate states of the world, however, and the empirical literature
to-date is limited. Our approach does not require extensive data. We hope that it may
thereby enable future work in this area.40
We hope also that our paper may more generally spur future work on monotonicity tests
as a tool for applied work. Predictions about monotonicity might be used to distinguish
between theories in other sorts of models as well. The robustness of the approach to common
econometric diﬃculties could be a signiﬁcant advantage.
40See Dafny (2005) for an interesting application to hospital markets.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1






































































where we have written
dπd∗
2
dz for the total derivative of πd∗
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where again all derivatives are evaluated at (A∗
ND(z),z).
The denominator of this expression is always positive. Given the assumption that
dπd∗
2
dz > 0, the numerator is a sum of the direct eﬀect and the product of the competition
eﬀect and something that is nonnegative. Hence, A∗
ND(z) will be monotone increasing if
the two eﬀects are positive and monotone decreasing if they are both negative.
QED.
B. Monte Carlo Study of Monotonicity Tests
Table 1 reports results of simulations designed to assess the size and power of the tests
of monotonicity we use.
The table reports the frequency with which monotonicity was rejected when we con-
structed simulated datasets using various data generating processes and then tested for
monotonicity via the same procedures we apply to our real data. To compute each entry
in the table we constructed 1000 simulated datasets, ran our bootstrap procedure to ﬁnd
estimated 5% critical values, and then compared the value of the test statistic on the simu-
lated dataset to the estimated critical value.41 The simulated datasets had 100 data points
with uniform draws on [0,1]. The ﬁrst column reports rejection rates (based on 5% critical
41We used 1000 bootstrap repetitions to construct the estimated critical values. The procedure for doing
these was to ﬁt an isotone regression to the simulated dataset and draw errors from the diﬀerence between
the actual and ﬁtted values.
37values) for the Hall-Heckman style test with smoothing parameter m = 15. The second
column reports rejection rates for the Ellison-Ellison style test with window width w = 0.2.
The ﬁrst three rows of the table examine the size of the test statistics under three
diﬀerent monotone data generating processes. The ﬁrst, labeled M1, is Ai = i, with i a
standard normal random variable. The second, M2, is Ai = x(2−x)+i. In the third, M3, Ai
is a 0/1 variable generated from the linear probability model Prob{Ai = 1|zi} = 0.25+0.5zi.
The rejection rates are usually around 5% as they should be.
The fourth and ﬁfth rows examine the power of the tests when applied to nonmonotone
data generating processes. The process labelled NM1 consisted of setting Ai = 10zi(1.4 −
zi)+i, with i a standard normal random variable. Note that this function is increasing on
[0,0.7) and decreasing on (0.7,1]. The value at the right endpoint is 0.9 less than the value
at the peak, which is slightly less than one standard deviation of the error distribution. In
the process labelled NM2, Ai is a 0/1 variable with Prob{Ai = 1|zi} = 0.25 + 2zi(1 − zi).
The rejection rates in these simulations range from 26.8% to 47.2%. Hence, one can think of
processes NM1 and NM2 as exemplifying the magnitude of the departure from monotonicity
that must be present in the data to be detected by our tests.
Table 1: Simulation study of size and power of monotonicity tests
Data generating Rejections with 5% critical values






The table presents rejection rates for the Hall-Heckman and Ellison-Ellison style monotonic-
ity tests when applied to ﬁve data generating processes with 5% critical values obtained
from a bootstrap procedure.
38C. List of Drugs Used in the Study
Generic name Brand names Expiration Revenue3 Entry3Y r
albuterol proventil 1989 172,952 1
ventolin
amiodarone hydrochloride cordarone 1990 11,283 0
amoxapine asendin 1989 18,306 1
atenolol tenormin 1991 301,311 1
tenoretic
auranoﬁn ridaura 1992 9,766 0
baclofen lioresal 1986 12,033 1
betamethasone celestone 1986 8,226 0
bretylium tosylate bretylol 1986 10,418 1
bromocriptine mesylate parlodel 1990 54,031 0
carbidopa sinemet 1991 91,883 1
carboprost tromethamine hemabate 1990 189 0
chlorpheniramine maleate ornade 1986 15,303 1
chlorthalidone combipres 1986 15,988 1
cinoxacin cinobac 1989 5,680 1
clonidine catapres 1986 70,045 1
clorazepate dipotassium tranxene 1987 87,533 1
clotrimazole gyne-lotrimin 1989 55,283 0
mycelex
lotrimin
colestipol hydrochloride colestid 1989 7,089 0
cromolyn sodium nasalcrom 1989 49,640 1
intal
cyclobenzaprine hydrochlor ﬂexeril 1986 40,630 1
cytarabine cytosar 1986 8,140 1
deferoxamine mesylate desferal 1986 3,366 0
desipramine hydrochloride norpramin 1986 19,439 1
desmopressin acetate ddavp 1987 6,112 0
dimethyl sulfoxide rimso50 1987 296 0
dipivefrin hydrochloride propine 1991 23,353 1
doxepin hydrochloride adapin 1986 55,059 1
sinequan
dronabinol marinol 1990 1,454 0
enﬂurane ethrane 1987 19,337 1
fenoprofen calcium nalfon 1988 49,538 1
cont’d
39Generic name Brand names Expiration Revenue3 Entry3Y r
ﬂuocinonide lidex 1988 24,012 1
ﬂuorometholone ﬂuor-op 1989 93 0
ﬂurandrenolide cordran 1989 4,527 0
guanfacine hydrochloride tenex 1991 23,530 0
halazepam paxipam 1986 1,621 0
haloperidol haldol 1986 72,705 1
ipratropium bromide atrovent 1991 37,356 0
ketoprofen orudis 1991 60,313 1
loperamide hydrochloride imodium 1990 28,278 1
loxapine hydrochloride loxitane 1987 11,567 1
mazindol mazanor 1990 2,001 0
sanorex
mebendazole vermox 1989 6,154 0
metaproterenol sulfate alupent 1986 39,260 1
miconazole monistat 1991 107,102 1
molindone hydrochloride moban 1987 2,725 0
nalidixic acid neggram 1988 4,501 1
naloxone hydrochloride narcan 1986 15,262 1
naltrexone trexan 1989 723 0
norgestrel ovrette 1991 637 0
pancuronium bromide pavulon 1988 18,801 1
piroxicam feldene 1992 216,998 1
prazosin hydrochloride minipress 1989 67,923 1
procarbazine hydrochloride matulane 1987 565 0
pyrantel antiminth 1989 597 0
stanozolol winstrol 1989 541 0
sulfasalazine azulﬁdine 1988 9181 1
sulindac clinoril 1990 164,545 1
timolol maleate blocadren 1989 114,148 1
timoptic
tolmetin sodium tolectin 1990 48,654 1
tretinoin retin a 1990 61,167 0
trilostane modrastane 1989 24 0
verapamil hydrochloride isoptin 1986 56,494 1
calan
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Figure 2: Equilibrium advertising levels in the model of advertising with spillovers
The ﬁgure graphs the equilibrium advertising intensity in the model of section 2.3 where
advertising raises consumers valuations both for the branded drug and for a generic sub-
stitute. The distribution of entry costs is assumed to be lognormal with mean 0.0025 and
standard deviation 0.0015. The dotted line is the equilibrium advertising level when adver-
tising is not observed until after ﬁrm 2’s entry decision is made (and hence there is no entry
deterrence motive.) The solid line is the equilibrium advertising level when advertising is
observed in advance of the potential entry.
45Table 2: Variable names
Variable Name Variable Description
Entry3Y r 1 if entry within 3 years of patent expiration
EntryProb Predicted entry probability
Chronic 0 if for acute illness; 1 if for chronic illness
HospFrac Hospital fraction of revenue (for year prior to patent expiration)
Revenue3 Average annual revenue for 3 years prior to patent expiration
(000’s constant dollars)
TherSubs Number of other drugs in the therapeutic class
Detail Monthly detailing advertising (000’s of minutes)
Journal Monthly journal advertising expenditures (000’s of constant dollars)
Detail3 Average annual detailing in 3 years before patent expiration
Journal3 Average annual journal advertising in 3 years before patent expiration
PresHerf HospFrac-weighted average of drugstore and hospital presentation Herﬁndahls
PresHerf3 Average of PresHerf in the 3 years before patent expiration
HPrice Hospital price (in constant dollars)
DPrice Drugstore price (in constant dollars)
Specialist Index for how often drugs in therapeutic class are prescribed by specialist
Psych 1 if drug is psychoactive
Topical 1 if drug is applied topically
The table describes the variables used in the analysis.
Table 3: Summary statistics
Number of Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation
Entry3Y r 63 0.59 0.50
Revenue3 63 39,355 55,754
log(Revenue3) 63 9.40 2.00
HospFrac 63 0.21 0.30
Chronic 63 0.63 0.42
TherSubs 63 8.48 6.04
Detail3/Revenue3 69 0.005 0.008
Journal3/Revenue3 70 0.014 0.022
PresHerf3 70 0.54 0.29
DPricet/DPricet−1 245 1.019 0.067
HPricet/HPricet−1 233 1.010 0.129
The table presents summary statistics for some of the variables used in our analysis.
46Table 4: Summary statistics by revenue quintile
Mean within revenue quintile
Variable Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5
Revenue3 882 7,572 22,161 52,336 127,359
Entry3Y r 0.00 0.43 0.86 0.80 0.92
Number of Obs. 13 14 14 10 12
The table reports the mean annual revenues in the three years prior to patent expiration
and the fraction of drugs experiencing entry for drugs in each revenue quintile.
Table 5: Entry versus pre-expiration revenues












Number of Obs. 63 63
PseudoR2 0.40 0.43
The table presents estimates of probit models. The dependent variable is a dummy for
whether entry occurs within three years of patent expiration. The explanatory variables
are average revenue in the three years prior to patent expiration, the fraction of sales which
are through hospitals (as opposed to drugstores), a measure of whether the drug treats a
chronic or acute condition, and the number of other drugs in the therapeutic class. The
observations are 63 drug molecules which lost patent protection at some point between 1986
and 1992.






log(Revenue3) 0.000 0.003 -0.069
(0.001) (0.002) (0.016)








Constant -0.014 -0.014 0.990
(0.014) (0.041) (0.360)
Number of Obs. 69 70 70
R2 0.04 0.06 0.52
The table reports coeﬃcient estimates from linear regressions of three types of investment,
two advertising-to-sales ratios and the Herﬁndahl index of presentations, on the average
revenue in the three years prior to patent expiration, the square of this variable minus its
mean, and appropriate controls. The unit of observation is branded drugs which lost patent
protection between 1986 and 1992.
Table 7: Incumbent behavior versus market size: quintile means and monotonicity tests
Variable mean for drugs in revenue quintile Monotonicity test p-value
Variable Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 H-H Test E-E Test
Detail3/Revenue3 0.0051 0.0012 0.0055 0.0084 0.0041 0.274 0.161
Journal3/Revenue3 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.024 0.018 0.053 0.197
PresHerf3 0.78 0.64 0.49 0.44 0.35 0.336 0.187
The table reports the means of three types of investment, two advertising measures and the
Herﬁndahl index of presentations, by revenue quintiles. Drugs are classiﬁed into quintiles
based on the mean of their revenue for the three years prior to patent expiration. The EE
and HH test columns reports the p-values for two tests of non-monotonicity (Ellison and
Ellison 2000, Hall and Heckman 2000).
48Table 8: Changes in incumbent behavior as expiration approaches: quintile means and
monotonicity tests
Fraction increasing by quintile Monotonicity test p-value
Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 H-H Test E-E Test
Detail3 0.75 0.22 0.25 0.54 0.62 0.307 0.031
(4) (9) (12) (13) (13)
Journal3 0.50 0.43 0.17 0.29 0.31 0.321 0.696
(2) (7) (12) (14) (13)
PresHerf 0.33 0.42 0.38 0.50 0.62 0.083 0.217
(6) (12) (13) (14) (13)
DPrice 0.70 0.58 0.75 0.54 0.92 0.430 0.601
(10) (12) (12) (13) (13)
HPrice 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.77 0.73 0.573 0.854
(8) (12) (13) (13) (11)
This table reports the fraction of drugs in each revenue quintile for which the investment
variable was higher in the year immediately prior to patent expiration than it was on average
in the previous two years. The number of observations in each cell is in parentheses below
the quintile means.
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